IS RUSSIA READY TO LOSE THE ARTIC ?

IS RUSSIA ABOUT TO LOSE EVERYTHING IN THE ARTIC via changes in ANTARTICA AND GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY CONCERNS BY NATO and, THE UK and THE EU? | Ariane Brito - Academia.edu 

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IS RUSSIA ABOUT TO LOSE EVERYTHING IN THE ARTIC via changes in ANTARTICA AND GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY CONCERNS BY NATO and, THE UK and THE EU?

Russia invading and dealing with matters using military means and not all necessary means, is something that there is no shortage on the media these days, but is the world ready to see the European Union beat Russia, not using military means but all other necessary means?

When it comes to shady deals involving international expansionist forces, we the public often prefer to know nothing about, but what about seeing the European Union Parliament live debating on how to make sanctions against Russia more effective followed by a session on how the European Union can have regulatory power over the Antarctic continent?

Above: Poster of Upcoming event

Above: European Union notice “Suspension of regional cooperation with Russia”

Above: Notice of Suspension of All Artic Council Activities until further notice

And wouldn’t be the cherry on top of the cake, if one hour before we had the opportunity to watch the European Parliament assess the current sanctions on Russia and how the States can exercise bigger pressure over Russia regarding Ukraine?

This is precisely what will take place at the European Parliament on the 14th of June 2002, with session on Russia starting at 13:30 and the public hearing by the European Commission chaired by Mr David McAllister starting at 14:30.

The United Kingdom Antarctic Act 1994 defined Antarctica as,

With the purpose of regulating British expeditions visits to Antarctica, entry and exit of its territories and mainly access to fauna, flora, mineral, and maritime resources etc.

While the Antarctica remains subject only to environmental ambitions on the part of the United Kingdom and other western nations, the Artic Region is under a British Government plan for “extension of Great Britain Global influence” and protecting the local environment and its local policies as per the UK Minister of State for the Polar Regions 2018 ‘Beyond the Ice – UK Policy towards the Artic’.

Is worst recalling that this 2018 policy is a clear culmination of research findings of the UK Parliament Select Committee on the Artic Report of Session 2014-2015 where the findings point at identifying Antarctica and the Artic as suffering from Climate change effects which require international assistance, in particular British international scientific leadership, and expanding influence in the regions.

I found of particular importance the quote below regarding the Artic and the Antarctic,

“There are a number of significant differences between the Arctic and the Antarctic. While the Antarctic is a continent surrounded by oceans, the Arctic is an ocean surrounded by continental landmasses and sovereign states. The Antarctic has no permanent human population, being home to no more than 4,000-5,000 scientists and researchers at any one time.4 The Arctic, by contrast, has around four million residents, living in long-established, permanent communities. The Antarctic Treaty, which entered into force in 1961, bans military activity on the continent and establishes the freedom of scientific investigation.5 There is no comparable treaty for the Arctic.

There are, however, some similarities between the two polar regions. The UK has an important history of both Arctic and Antarctic exploration, commercial activity and scientific research, and the British Antarctic Survey and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s Polar Regions Department have interests in both poles. Significantly, both Antarctica and the Arctic are being affected by climate change and are connected to planetary processes, with glacial retreat and the melting of ice sheets occurring in both polar regions”

In Parliament (…..)

“85. Increasing access to at least the marine Arctic is making the region an area of increasing international economic and political strategic interest. The United States and Russia come into close proximity in the Arctic region, and the possibility of the Arctic serving as another arena for the flexing of China’s muscles has excited much commentary—China describes itself as a ‘near-Arctic state’.118 As seen above, commercial competition in the Arctic is often interpreted in exclusively inter-state terms. The European Policies Research Centre at the University of Strathclyde considered the Arctic “an area of growing strategic importance”, and Dr Dmitriy Tulupov of the St. Petersburg State University agreed.119

86.Luke Coffey of The Heritage Foundation warned that the decrease of sea ice would mean “a larger military presence by more actors than ever before”, although other witnesses disagreed over the Arctic’s military-strategic importance and the significance of decreasing sea ice as a causal factor.120 Greenlandic independence from Denmark might further increase geopolitical interest in the region, especially if an independent Greenland decided not to become a member of NATO and remained outside the EU.121

87.The Ministry of Defence’s report Global Strategic Trends: Out to 2045 reported that the economic development of the region “is already beginning to render its governance arrangements of deep significance”; it considered that “Inter-country disputes within the Arctic, driven by access to, and control over, resources, are possible”, though unlikely to result in military conflict.122”

In Chapter 3: Globalisation and governance (parliament.uk)

Not only the findings in excerpt above point to the possibility of military conflict but also, excerpt below mentions findings of serious nature pointing to Russia military expansionist ambitions in the political ecosystem of Artic Regions Council with members belonging to NATO and opposing Crimea annexation by Russia,

“163.The Arctic Council will need to ensure observer states feel that their voice is listened to if it wants to either benefit further from their contributions or place more demands upon them. The UK should push for the criteria governing observer participation to be reviewed within the US Chairmanship (2015–17), with the aim of ensuring that observers such as the UK feel encouraged and incentivised to participate proactively and extensively in Arctic co-operation.

164.One way forward might be for the Arctic Council to consult different groups of observers according to the issue or geographical focus under discussion, rather than treating them as a homogenous bloc.262

165.Those concerned with the Arctic should seek to use the momentum around the region being generated by the enthusiasm of new observer states efficiently and effectively. Consideration should be given by the Arctic Council and observer states to how observer bodies’ Arctic efforts, especially in science, can be voluntarily co-ordinated to maximise results.

166.The continued growth of international pressure for influence on the Arctic region is inevitable.263 The Arctic has a global importance in terms of climate, its unique environment, and its potentials as a possible world trade route and source of scarce resources, as well as including the global commons of the Arctic high seas, so the widest possible co-operation on the Arctic’s future is vital.264 The rest of the world has a legitimate interest in the Arctic, so while an effective Arctic Council is necessary, the Council must also be open to further co-operation beyond its own membership.

Other international bodies and agreements affecting the Arctic

167.The Arctic Council, though pre-eminent, is not the only international governance arrangement involving the region: the Arctic is “covered by a dense web of collaboration, co-operation and co-ordination mechanisms and networks”, some of which were listed for us by the FCO (see Appendix 5).265

168.Five of the eight Arctic states—four of the five littoral states—are members of NATO, which conducts biennial Cold Response training exercises in the Norwegian Arctic.266 There are differences of opinion within the Arctic NATO states and within NATO over the extent to which NATO should be involved in the region and currently its direct engagement with the Arctic is minimal.267

169.For this reason, Mr Coffey found “curious” the assertion in the Government’s 2013 Arctic Policy Framework that in terms of Arctic stability and security, “The role of NATO will remain central”. Mr Coffey considered the UK to be “the best placed NATO member to broker an agreement on what NATO’s role in the Arctic should be” and argued that “Ahead of the next NATO Summit in Poland, the UK should work to ensure that consensus inside the alliance on the issue of Arctic security is achieved.”268

170.International co-operation on security issues in the Arctic has taken place in recent years through the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable (ASFR), including annual Arctic Chiefs of Defence meetings.269 The ASFR promotes Arctic security co-operation on issues such as situational awareness and search and rescue, and provides a forum for the Arctic states and a number of observer nations (including the UK) to discuss collective security challenges facing the Arctic.270 Nick Gurr, Director for International Security Policy for the Ministry of Defence, told us that the UK had been able to have constructive discussions about security issues within that forum.271

171.This trust-building Roundtable has been “the most notable casualty” of tensions over Crimea, Mr Willis told us: the Chiefs of Defence meetings seem to be suspended and Russia has had no significant recent involvement with the ASFR.272 Mr Willis was concerned that “If the absence of the Arctic’s single most capable player continues for long, the value of the ASFR will be substantially diminished” and that “Most damagingly, the channels for military-to-military communication it has helped open between Russia and its neighbours—vital to co-ordinating a response to any emergency—are likely to close up.”273 The future of the Roundtable is currently uncertain, but Mr Gurr told us that the desire to co-operate persisted.274 The North Atlantic Coast Guard Forum, which includes all eight Arctic states, proceeded without Russian involvement in 2014, Mr Le Mière noted.275

172.Various regional groupings are relevant to Arctic co-operation, including the Barents Euro-Arctic Council276, Nordic Council of Ministers277, Northern Group278, Council of the Baltic Sea States279, the Northern Research Forum280 and the ‘Northern Dimension’, a joint policy of the European Union, Russia, Norway and Iceland which “offers the EU a framework to advance the EU’s Arctic objectives in the European Arctic area together with the [other Northern Dimension] partners, in particular in the fields of environmental protection and nuclear safety and improving transport and logistics”.281

173.While none of our witnesses saw an immediate role in the Arctic for the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), we consider that, in certain circumstances, the fact that all eight Arctic states are members of the OSCE could provide a useful mechanism for handling a situation of increasing tension, were such a situation to arise.282

174.Groupings, agreements and treaties applying to particular Arctic-related fields are also a part of the picture.283 As discussed above, UNCLOS establishes the legal framework for the maritime Arctic, while the London-based International Maritime Organisation of the UN is in the process of agreeing a Polar Code for shipping (see Chapter 5); various fisheries bodies are relevant to the regulation of Arctic fishing (see Chapter 5).

175.In environmental protection, a number of UN environmental bodies are relevant, including the UN Environment Program (which is an Arctic Council observer), while a sizeable array of environmental protection agreements such as the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) have application in the region.284 Climatic and meteorological bodies such as the World Meteorological Organisation are also germane.285

176.A number of other fora on Arctic issues have sprung up in recent years alongside the Arctic Council, often open to wider audiences and broader participation. The Arctic Circle Assembly has been held annually in Rekjavík since 2013,286 and the Arctic Frontiers conference has been held annually since 2007 in Tromsø, Norway.287 The Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region is a biennial conference for parliamentarians representing the eight Arctic countries and the European Parliament, with Arctic indigenous peoples represented as Permanent Participants (plus observers—our Chairman attended its 2014 meeting in Whitehorse, Canada).288

177.Arctic fora in addition to the Arctic Council are important for building international consensus on Arctic issues, and should be encouraged.

178.It is quite probable that yet more bodies and agreements will come to acquire relevance in the Arctic as the sea ice melts and the region at least appears more open to further activities and international influences, and as additional agreements such as the Polar Code are concluded and implemented, further tying the Arctic into global legal and multilateral frameworks. Elizabeth Kirk from the University of Dundee criticised the “fragmentation” in Arctic governance arrangements, but there was widespread agreement that a treaty along the lines of the Antarctic Treaty would not be appropriate to the Arctic because of the very different legal, geographical, demographic and geopolitical circumstances.289

Conclusion

179.As access to at least the maritime Arctic increases and international commercial, scientific, campaigning, personal and governmental attention on the region strengthens, a significant and difficult challenge facing Arctic states and residents and non-Arctic interests will be managing global demands to either exploit or to exercise stewardship over this simultaneously inhabited and wild region and its changing environment.

180.The Arctic will be the site of economic, geopolitical and cultural claims, conversations and disputes in the years ahead, although the risk of territorial or military conflict seems low. The UK’s interest, the global interest, and the interest of Arctic citizens will be best served by the highest possible degree of rules-based negotiation and the widest possible scope of international co-operation and consent. The UK needs to be ready to bring its influence to bear in the region where appropriate to further its own interests and those of the common good.”

In, Responding to a Changing Artic, Report of Section 2014-15 Select Committee on the Artic, the House of Lords Chapter 4: The impact of Arctic changes: internal pressures and opportunities within the Arctic (parliament.uk) Accessed 05/06/2022

We would be very naïve to believe that the United Kingdom is the only superpower of the world assessing the Artic and Antarctica territories as territories that need effective international concerted actions not only to prevent future military actions but also to curtail present further military advancements by Russia to the detriment of international security.

The institute of research to provide advice to the current German Government and other prominent international organisations is actively supplying research findings indicating that Russia is now a dangerous presence in the Artic.

The German Institute for International and Security Affairs published a research paper in February 2022 ‘ Russia in the Artic - Development Plans, Military Potential, and Conflict Prevention’ that sheds light on how Russia is providing China ships with ice breakers ample access to the Artic and how is using the Artic as an international offensive platform with increase military exercises that affect and intimidate locals and the Artic nations of Canada, Greenland, Finland,  and the Farce islands (Kingdom of Denmark),  Iceland, Norway,  Sweden and the United States:

“In the past few years, Russia’s military activities in the region that impact on neighbouring countries have markedly increased. These include simulated air attacks on radar facilities in Vardø, Norway; the deployment of GPS jamming transmitters in the borderlands of the Baltic States and vis-à-vis Finland; and reinforced submarine patrols near Norwegian territorial waters. In October 2019 ten Russian submarines passed through the European North Sea on their way to the North Atlantic – the largest deployment of its kind since the Cold War. During the NATO exercise Allied Sky, a Russian fighter jet followed a US bomber right into Danish airspace, and Sweden has complained of numerous violations of its airspace and territorial waters. 122 During the military manoeuvres of August 2020 carried out by the Russian navy in the Bering Sea off the coast of Alaska, an American fishing vessel in the US’s exclusive economic zone was harassed by a Russian fighter jet to the extent that the ship’s crew felt threatened.

In page 30 , SWP , Russia in the Arctic. Development Plans, Military Potential, and Conflict Prevention (swp-berlin.org) , Accessed 05/06/2022

The SWP recommends that NATO takes a Pan-European approach to the artic via militarising the Artic region,

“To strengthen NATO’s deterrence, it is not enough to fill gaps in its capabilities; geographical gaps must be closed as well. NATO’s defence planning must be pan-European. From the Alliance’s perspective, deter[1]rence without militarising the Arctic will be almost impossible. Military capabilities must be developed, trained, and positioned. For a few years now, NATO cadres have considered adapting the NATO Response Forces (NRF) to the security situation and threats as perceived by the Alliance. The readiness initiative, launched by the US and adopted by NATO in 2018, theoretically assures the Alliance of the availability of certain contingents and units within a notice to move period of 30 days (30 battalions, 30 ships, 30 aircraft squadrons).”

In page 36 , SWP , Russia in the Arctic. Development Plans, Military Potential, and Conflict Prevention (swp-berlin.org) , Accessed 05/06/2022

My problem with SWP findings is that seems to paint Russia as a visionary offensive force from which NATO is very inexperienced in dealing with and therefore should at all costs rely on seeking legal provisions to establish strong military presence in the Artic region.

Russia has taken an offensive stance against NATO relying in tech rather than the military in the Artic region. Indeed, the NATO Parliamentarians in 2018 after lengthy research, published a report followed by a resolution declaring that Russia was interfering with NATO countries elections.

Of historical relevance are the findings:

“75. As Mr Coats’ testimony indicates and this report shows, the problem of Russian election interference is not going away. If anything, recent events suggest that it will be a more significant part of Russia’s toolkit than ever before. With a budget amounting to a few million US dollars, Russian forces can sow distrust and mayhem, build support for friendly politicians, and undermine enemies. While some steps have been taken to counter Russian meddling by means of cyber and information operations, Russia itself has faced few consequences for its interference. Many alleged targets of Russia’s activities remain mired in internal debates that undermine any collective response. 76. To prevent further erosion of liberal democratic principles, NATO member states will need to take concerted efforts to strengthen their electoral processes. This need will become increasingly pressing, as evidence mounts those other countries, including China and Iran, have employed tactics similar to Russia’s. Some of those efforts are detailed in previous sections, but member states will need to examine the pressures and circumstances affecting their country and develop a response accordingly. Russia adapts its operations to its targets and, thus, responses will need to be adapted as well. Your Rapporteur must underline, however, that individual and collective responses must be rooted in our common values, including individual liberty, human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. These values can be exploited by an adversary, but they can also be our greatest asymmetric advantage. If we do not uphold these values, we undermine the democratic processes that we wish to safeguard and lose any advantage they provide. 77. As policymakers and agenda-setters, legislators play a particularly large role in this process. Consequently, lawmakers will need to foster dialog within their countries about how to rebut and respond to allegations of interference. They will need to work with their colleagues in other parties to ensure that credible allegations are believed by their constituents and civil society at large. They will need to ensure that allegations are investigated in a fair and impartial manner. While your Rapporteur recognizes the difficulty of these tasks, she hopes that this report can inform discussions and help member states recognize the threat posed by these operations. Indeed, your Rapporteur appreciates the input on the first draft of the report during the Spring Session from members of the Committee – and from associate members who have often suffered from Russia’s cyber and information operations. In particular, your Rapporteur welcomed input on the lessons they and their governments have drawn from cases where their countries were subjected to information warfare – what worked well and what did not. The input was invaluable in preparing the concrete policy recommendations in this final report as well as in the proposed resolution for the NATO Secretary General and Allied governments and parliaments

In 2018 Report by NATO Parliamentary Assembly Science and Technology Committee, or NATO STC, RUSSIAN MEDDLING IN ELECTIONS AND REFERENDA IN THE ALLIANCE, presented by Susan Davis (USA) 2018

Not only is NATO engaging in other ways to fight Russia expansion in the cyberworld but, likewise the United Kingdom, is also engaged in approaching security influence in the Artic via Environmental policies.

NATO goes further in assessing the environment as a factor that increases military risks and therefore requires more action on their part, and that will require more power for international alliances and less for sovereign nations as the world security is at risk:

“5. The growing importance of the region, mainly due to Russian and Chinese interests, requires NATO to adapt to a new security environment. Strengthening regional bilateral, trilateral and multinational security cooperation will be key, as will a comprehensive approach across all IoPs (not just the military); but evolving relationships in the region must not harm or weaken NATO cohesion. 6. As it has done over the past 20 years, the Artic Council will continue to be the primary regional intergovernmental and collaboration forum. In May 2021, Russia took over the Chairmanship of the Arctic Council, the Arctic Coast Guard Forum and the Arctic Economic Council. Without question, the international community and NATO will closely observe how Moscow maintains the focus on cooperation and the twin mandates of the Council (environmental protection and sustainable development) and the extent to which it manages its strategic partnership with Beijing and relates to discontent amongst indigenous stakeholders. Climate Change and Security: A Threat Multiplier in the Arctic 7. Climate change is rapidly becoming recognised as a growing global security issue that will have a significant bearing on the Alliance’s freedom to operate over the coming decades; impacting equipment, people, operating procedures, and infrastructure. At their core, climate-related threats are global issues that transcend traditional sovereignty roles(…) “

In NATO, REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE ARTIC – OTAN, 2021 regional-perspectives-2021-04.pdf (nato.int) Accessed 05/06/2022

The relevance of NATO shifting from international military security to environment concerns that override national sovereign powers is important in assessing how the Artic will be the subject of a future international legal configuration.

I believe so, because NATO shifting concerns to environment opens the doors to NATO military presence in the Antarctica waters which border the Artic.

I remind you that NATO or any other military presence in Antarctica is forbidden unless there is science concerns and support.

Of course, The British Royal Navy already patrols the Antarctic with environmental concerns in mind, but so does Russia claim to be a champion of preservation and environmental issues in the Ross Sea in Antarctica, which also according to Ross Dependency falls under New Zealand sovereignty.

Could we say that the Artic and the Antarctica will have more in common that the current situation of both being regulated under the Polar Code?

I believe so, because just like Russia have for the past years alleged environmental preservation concerns with Antarctica maritime life to block international projects, the Artic configuration in terms of environmental issues and the now come to a still of the Artic Council because of Russia invasion of Ukraine, when Russia had one more year of chairmanship of this Council, reveal how just like NATO stated in it’s latest report on Artic security that environmental issues reinforce international security concerns and demand more NATO power, the environment is now intertwined with sanctions and preventive measures of human pollution of the highest order : military expansion!

Ariane Brito

London, 05th of June 2022

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